The Price of a Hug

By Michael Oren

Casus belli is a Latin legal term meaning “justification for going to war.” Iran’s firing of 181 ballistic missiles at Israel constituted a clear and irrefutable casus belli.

Any price that the administration is willing to pay for Israeli restraint would have to appear worthwhile to the Israeli public. The overwhelming majority of Israelis expect our country to respond massively to Iran׳s missiles.

Accordingly, the United States and most of the West recognizes Israel’s right to retaliate against Iran. At the same time, they are seeking to limit the extent to which Israel exercises that right by insisting we attack neither Iran’s nuclear nor its oil facilities. They send senior military and diplomatic officials to “hug” us and ensure that we won’t dare act while they’re in Israel.

The result has been a prolonged delay in Israel’s response that threatens our security no less than the missiles themselves. With each passing day of inaction, Israel’s casus belli grows weaker. If and when Israel acts, the world will scarcely remember why. In the United States, especially, the image of Iranian missiles flying toward Tel Aviv will be obscured by those of cities ravaged by hurricanes and the latest developments in the presidential race. A part of the public and much of the press will criticize Israel for needlessly escalating the Middle East conflict, raising the price of gasoline, and trying to drag America into a total regional war.

What, besides avoiding further friction with the White House, does Israel have to gain by waiting? Is there a pressing national interest—a raison d’etat, to cite another diplomatic phrase—that Israel could fulfill. Can we use the American administration’s fear of our response to Iran to secure vital concessions from Washington?

One such concession would be the president’s agreement not to oppose Israel’s implementation of General Giora Eiland’s plan to declare northern Gaza a closed military zone and then trade territory for Hamas’s release of the hostages. Another concession would be a presidential commitment to intervene militarily against Iran’s nuclear plants once they enrich uranium above sixty percent. Yet another concession would be America’s agreement to sell us long-range strategic bombers capable of dropping 15,000 kilogram bunker buster bombs from a height that Iran’s defenses cannot reach. Such a sale would say to the Iranians “we won’t bomb your facilities this time but we have the means to do so effectively in the future.”

Any price that the administration is willing to pay for Israeli restraint would have to appear worthwhile to the Israeli public. The overwhelming majority of Israelis expect our country to respond massively to Iran׳s missiles. The public overwhelmingly rejects all of America’s demands except one—that Israel respond proportionately to Iran. Okay, we can say, we’ll fire at Iran the same 26,000 rockets they and their proxies have shot at us over the past year.